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Estructura de la critica de la razón pura — Transcript · YTtoTranscript

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Estructura de la critica de la razón pura

Heterocronías Feminismos y Epistemologías del Sur · 3,183 words · 16 min read · EN

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Below is the complete, readable transcript of Estructura de la critica de la razón pura by Heterocronías Feminismos y Epistemologías del Sur on YouTube. Read the full text, copy any part you need, or generate a transcript for any video with our free tool.

Good evening. This video is the first in our course, covering the section on Kahn that corresponds to Unit 1. Here, we'll be discussing the transcendental subject, which we'll later delve into in terms of the unity of the subject. But fundamentally, we'll be addressing the structure and key idea of Kahn's work, perhaps his most

emblematic, the Critique of Pure Reason. When we study a philosopher, we always have to ask ourselves what question motivates them, what question they try to answer with the development of the concept they're promoting. In this case, the idea they want to explore here is that of the transcendental subject. So, we need to

understand why they're interested in developing this notion of the transcendental subject. The question Kahn poses is what made science possible in Kahn's time. Science is physical and mathematical science, particularly that of Newton. Newton is a physicist and astronomer who fundamentally articulates all the knowledge in the field of physics; that is, he defines the field

of physics itself. Therefore, it has great value for knowledge because it gives stability to... That area of knowledge, and can be in that knowledge, precisely an achievement that, compared to metaphysics, the latter never had because it is always in disputes, in dilemmas, but metaphysics never manages to establish itself as a stable, articulated knowledge

as is the case of physics, as is something that Newton achieves. So Candice, well, what made it possible for Newton to, let's say, develop this theory? But in reality, we are posing the question more, if we pose it, not that Newton is the achievement, but rather the question that is asked here is how humanity

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came to develop science, physics in this case, how we got here. This is the question of what made it possible for this knowledge to arise. So, I clarify when Candice speaks of knowledge, scientific knowledge, and specifically that of mathematical physics. So that is what I asked him, and why is that not possible in

metaphysics? Because metaphysics is not established in the same way as physics. So what he says, well, the answer is that what made this science possible is the transcendental subject. That subject The transcendental is precisely the condition of possibility of physical-mathematical science, and here we have to see these two terms: subject and transcendental. Transcendental means

condition of possibility; it is what makes possible. So, we have to clearly differentiate transcendental from the term transcendent. They are two terms that are like opposites; they are similar but opposite; they have opposite meanings. Transcendent is any reality that is conceived as independent of the subject. In contrast, transcendental is what makes being possible; it is

a condition of possibility. And here we speak of the subject. When we speak of the subject, and even less so in Kant, we must think of the individual. Subject and individuals are two distinct terms, two distinct concepts; they are not equivalent at all. What does Kant refer to as the double subject? He

refers to a set of structures. So, when we have the term transcendental subject, we are talking about a set of structures that make possible. What things does it make possible? Two things: science and ethics. That is the transcendental subject. We are going to study how it makes science possible. So, he develops a work

called the Critique of Pure Reason to see how this transcendental subject makes science possible. In another work, for example, he will... It's the same with ethics, because ultimately this subject is transcendental. This transcendental subject is rationality, it's reason, better than reason, human reason. Yes, that human reason is precisely the transcendental subject. It is reason that makes

science possible. Reason, when directed towards knowledge, is theoretical reason, and when directed towards the distinction between good and evil, it is practical reason. If we are going to be interested in theoretical reason, theoretical reason is directed towards knowledge, and knowledge of the world, the natural world. While all these ideas are important for the topic of

our unit, which is the problematic nature of psychology as scientific knowledge, I know that in all this we must not lose sight of that notion. So what are we going to do here? Here we are going to see what study he makes of this transcendental subject in the work *Critique of Pure Reason*. I would like

you to accompany this video with a chart that I will upload to the virtual classroom, which is the chart precisely to accompany this video, which is the chart where the structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is shown. In that chart we have different rows that We've given it different names, and we're going to analyze them.

As we do that, we'll present the main concepts. The first column, let's say, will present the different parts of this work, and we're going to distinguish three of those parts: transcendental aesthetics, transcendental analytics, and transcendental dialectics. In the second column, we'll see which faculty is studied in each of those parts. So, we'll

see that there are three faculties: sensibility, which is studied in transcendental aesthetics; understanding, which is studied in transcendental analytics; and reason, which is studied in transcendental dialectics. These faculties are structures; together they constitute all of human reason. That is to say, they are structures. All these structures will have a receptive part and an active part. The

receptive part—because it deals with human faculties—that is, human reason. It's not divine reason, it's not angelic reason; it's human reason. This human reason has limits, since we are finite beings. So, what are these limits? These are the limits of human reason. One of the main limits is precisely its finitude. Let's say it's given by this

limit, which is that of receptivity. What does that mean? That human reason cannot be set in motion if it doesn't receive something. That is to say, there has to be something. As we'll say, if it's a motor mode, there has to be fuel for it to function. It has to receive something. But that would be the receptive part.

Later we'll see what happens in each of the faculties. And on the other hand, it has an active part. That active part is what is proper to each of these faculties, and that is a priori. Yes, a priori means that it is independent of experience. That is to say, these are structures that exist before

experience. Well, when these two parts unite—the receptive part, since it has received something, and the active part, the a priori part— then a synthesis occurs. Note here that by synthesis we shouldn't understand anything like a summary, but rather the union of two distinct elements into a new unity. That is a synthesis. And

so, when these two parts unite, active civil peace A new element is produced; that part is, let's say, that faculty that makes a certain science possible. That is the structure that we are going to develop in transcendental aesthetics. We had said that the faculty of sensibility has been studied. Sensibility does have a

receptive part. What is the receptive part? It is precisely the data of the senses: sounds, colors. That is the information of the senses. Yes, that is what this faculty, which is sensibility, receives, and that is what sets it in motion. And in turn, the faculty of sensibility has its own structures, and those structures are two:

space and time. That is to say, we are saying that space and time are structures that are in the subject, not outside the subject, not in reality, not in things, but they are in the subject specifically. They are structures of sensibility; they are a priori forms of sensibility. When space and time are joined to

the data of the senses, what we obtain is the phenomenon. That is to say, the phenomenon is constituted by the data of the senses and by the forms of space and time. I am presenting this now; later we are going to develop all of this, and we will... To delve deeper into what science this faculty is

concerned with, which makes this faculty possible, mathematics, and the question it attempts to answer is how is mathematics possible? Mathematics is possible thanks to these structures of sensibility. Well, we have another faculty, which is the understanding. The understanding is a faculty that will be studied in the transcendental analytic. This faculty also has a reactive part because it is still

a human faculty. What is the receptive part? Well, precisely the receptive part is the phenomenon that is given here to sensibility; that is, sensibility passes on to the understanding the phenomenon that it substitutes. So, when we have that phenomenon, the understanding, which has its own active part, that is, it has its own structures. And when

we have those structures, which are the categories—that is, the categories are the a priori structures of the understanding— when these categories are united with the phenomenon, we obtain the object; that is, the object is constituted by the phenomenon plus the categories. The question that is asked here is how is physics possible thanks to the

understanding? Thanks to this union of the phenomenon with the categories, and that is precisely what makes physics possible; that is, with science and, but, with sensibility. And understanding makes science possible. One more thing: sensibility's function is to intuit. Intuition, and understanding's function is what allows us to think. We can think thanks to

understanding, and to compensate, it's equivalent to judging. That's where it ends. Well, now we know what made science possible: these two human faculties, sensibility and understanding. Notice that the question wasn't how Newton arrived at physics, not a psychological question. It's a question of how humanity came to understand that physics is a kind of heritage of humanity.

How did humanity arrive at it? Thanks to sensibility and understanding working together. So what we have here is this structure, but... and the thing is, human reason isn't enough. It wants to go further, so it begins to look for the foundation of the foundation of the foundation. While it receives reason, it also has

reason. It will study it in transcendental dialectics. It will have a passive part; it will receive the objects that understanding has achieved along with sensibility. Of course, it will receive these objects and organize them into centers. Let's say, it was going to arrive at three ideas, which are the synthesis. What does reason produce? These three ideas are

the idea of the soul, which is what will interest us today, the idea of the world, and the idea of God. But it turns out that for Khan, these three ideas do not produce knowledge because they have no phenomenal basis. For Khan, there can only be knowledge of objects, that is, objects that have been constituted by the

subject from a phenomenal basis, that is, from phenomena. In other words, when we have zero categories, then that is when we can really speak of knowledge. So what happens with these ideas? Well, here he speaks of a transcendental illusion. Reason has been lost, has gone astray, has fallen into an illusion. So when that

happens, where is that knowledge found? It happens in metaphysics. But metaphysics is not a science. The question that comes close here is not how metaphysics is possible, but the question is whether metaphysics is possible as a scientific knowledge. And the answer is no, because it has strayed too far from the phenomenon. Yes, and so it has fallen into

deception, it has gone astray. Visit here. It is constituted by three disciplines. Let's say the one that studies the self or the soul, which is psychology; the one that studies the world, which is cosmology; and the one that studies God, which is theology. These three disciplines are not science; they are metaphysics. That's why

psychology isn't a science, nor can it become one. Furthermore, it falls within the realm of the human. For Kant, scientific knowledge can only be knowledge of the natural world, because it is a stable world, because it is a regular world; we can have laws, we have stability. In contrast, in the human world,

as Kant conceives of the human being as free, we cannot have stability, and therefore we cannot have knowledge. So, that knowledge of the human is not possible. In this era, the only developed human discipline was psychology. Therefore, it is very real, and that affects all the human sciences, which, for us, are not sciences and

cannot become sciences. Here, it only speaks of psychology, but it already places a kind of obstacle in the way of all knowledge about the human. So, from that point on, psychology, since there are precedents with this concept, is always found in that realm. Whether it is philosophy or natural science, yes, and always having To

demonstrate its scientific nature, we'll look at some strategies, like Freud does, for example, in his dialogue with Kahn. So, that's what we need to be clear about, because for Kahn, psychology falls outside the realm of scientific knowledge. And that's what we'll see when we develop the Critique of Pure Reason, and it remains within the realm of the deception of

transcendental illusion. So, we have to understand that science seems to be basically constituted by judgments. Then Kahn asks what types of judgments constitute science. In Kahn's time, logicians had established two types of judgments: analytic judgments and synthetic judgments. Analytic judgments are characterized by the fact that the information given in the subject and the predicate is

the same. For example, if we say "a triangle is a three-angled figure," the subject is "the triangle," the predicate is "a three-angled figure." So, if we analyze the predicate, we see that all its elements are contained in the subject. If we say "a figure," we say "the triangle is a three-angled figure"—it is

contained in... The term "triangle," that is, in the subject, therefore we can even talk about a triangle or substitute " three-angled figure" and it wouldn't affect us at all. We have a text and we put " three-angled figure" where it says "triangle," and we would get the same idea. So that's because it's an analytic judgment.

If analytic judgments have three characteristics: they are universal, meaning that it applies to all triangles; they are a priori, meaning that their truth does not depend on experience; and they are necessary. Here we are talking about logical necessity, meaning that their opposite is impossible. If that is true, then to say that a

triangle is not a three- angled figure would not be possible. These are necessary judgments, logical necessity. We are also talking about synthetic judgments, which are the other group of judgments recognized by the logicians of that time. These are judgments in which there is a difference of information between the subject and the predicate.

For example, I say "the book is blue." Well, the subject is "the book," the predicate is "blue," and "blue" is not contained in the concept of "book." Therefore, the information of the subject does not coincide with the information of the predicate. So, what characteristics do they have? The characteristic they have Synthetic judgments are

contingent; they can be true or false, not necessary. For example, there might be books that are blue or green, and the statement that books are blue would be true, or books that are not blue, and that could also be true. Both situations can be true, but they are not necessary judgments. These judgments are

particular; that is, the statement that a book is blue is not true for all books, and they are contingent. So, Candice, by which of these judgments is science constituted? Analytic judgments, as we said, have good points; for example, they are necessary, universal, and a priori. But they have a problem: they don't increase knowledge

because the information given in the predicate coincides with the subject. They don't increase knowledge; they don't increase information. On the other hand, synthetic judgments increase knowledge, but they are particular and contingent. So, Candice says, science must be constituted by neither of these. There must be a third type of judgment: synthetic a priori judgments.

Synthetic a priori judgments are judgments that increase knowledge, and they are judgments that, in addition to increasing knowledge, also increase information. Knowledge is a priori, universal, and necessary. An example given by Camps himself is that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points. If we analyze the points contained within a straight line, then

the straight line is a succession of points, but the shortest distance between them is not contained in the concept of a straight line. Therefore, it is a synthetic judgment, but it is a universal judgment, valid for all straight lines. It is a necessary judgment, necessarily true, although this may change historically. But for

Camps' time, and fundamentally, what constitutes a priori judgment is indeed true. Remember that a priori means independent of experience. So the question posed here is reformulated: when Camps asks how mathematics is possible, he will ask how synthetic a priori judgments are possible in mathematics. Both questions are equivalent. And when he asks how physics is possible, he

will ask how synthetic a priori judgments in physics are possible; that is, what makes it possible for mathematics to have synthetic a priori judgments and for physics to have synthetic a priori judgments? The answer, as we have seen, is human reason. And with metaphysics, the question will be asked: is it possible for metaphysics to

have synthetic a priori judgments? Is it possible for psychology to have synthetic a priori judgments? Is it possible for cosmology and theology to have synthetic a priori judgments? Well, the answer will be, I don't know, because of what we've already seen: metaphysics implies a reason that has been lost, that has fallen into illusion, into deception. Later, we'll

see that this illusion is part of the human condition, that is, knowing that it deceives us. This doesn't imply that almost all cultures have had an idea of self, of soul; they've had an idea of the world, they've had an idea of God, but that doesn't constitute knowledge. So, this is basically what's

expressed there in this part that we're going to see in Unit 1, and that we'll continue to develop and delve into. It's a bit of a presentation by Camps, and he's the author with whom we'll be constantly engaging, because later we'll see clearly what implications this subject has. I ask you to watch this video

along with the chart that will also be uploaded, and we'll put it below the chart. Let's say that's where it outlines the car of what I'm saying. Well, see you in the next video.